麦克阿瑟告别演讲:老兵不死

麦克阿瑟告别演讲:老兵不死

道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟是美国著名军事将领,1944年授衔五星上将,并且曾任菲律宾陆军元帅｡今天给大家分享一篇麦克阿瑟告别的英文演讲,希望对大家有所帮助｡

麦克阿瑟告别演讲英文版:老兵不死

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and Distinguished Members of the

Congress:

I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great

pride -- humility in the wake of those great American architects of

our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection

that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in the

purest form yet devised. Here are centered the hopes and aspirations

and faith of the entire human race. I do not stand here as advocate

for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach

quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be

resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is

to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you

will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as

solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.

I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading

twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country.

The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the

problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to

court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as

the Gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the Gateway

to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its

impact upon the other. There are those who claim our strength is

inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our

effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. If a

potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us

to counter his effort. The Communist threat is a global one. Its

successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every

other sector. You can not appease or otherwise surrender to communism

in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its

advance in Europe.

Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my

discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may objectively

assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend something

of Asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her

course up to the present. Long exploited by the so-called colonial

powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social

justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as

guided our own noble administration in the Philippines, the peoples

of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the

shackles of colonialism and now see the dawn of new opportunity, a

heretofore unfelt dignity, and the self-respect of political freedom.

Mustering half of the earth's population, and 60 percent of its

natural resources these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force,

both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and

erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own

distinct cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the concept of

colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it

may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world

economic frontiers as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates

back toward the area whence it started.

In this situation, it becomes vital that our own country orient

its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition

rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial

era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their

own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance,

understanding, and support -- not imperious direction -- the dignity

of equality and not the shame of subjugation. Their pre-war standard

of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation

left in war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian

thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is

the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little

better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads,

and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political

freedom. These political-social conditions have but an indirect

bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to

contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are

to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.

Of more direct and immediate bearing upon our national security

are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the Pacific

Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western

strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of

the Americas, with an exposed island salient extending out through

Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines. That salient proved not

an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the

enemy could and did attack.

The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory

force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. All this was

changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted

to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which became a vast moat to

protect us as long as we held it. Indeed, it acts as a protective

shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific

Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands

extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Mariannas held by us

and our free allies. From this island chain we can dominate with sea

and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore --

with sea and air power every port, as I said, from Vladivostok to

Singapore -- and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.

*Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort.* No

amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes

and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and

air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major

attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends in the Pacific

would be doomed to failure.

Under such conditions, the Pacific no longer represents menacing

avenues of approach for a prospective invader. It assumes, instead,

the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a

natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort

and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone, nor does it

provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly

maintained, would be an invincible defense against aggression. The

holding of this littoral defense line in the western Pacific is

entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof; for any major

breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to

determined attack every other major segment.

This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a

military leader who will take exception. For that reason, I have

strongly recommended in the past, as a matter of military urgency,

that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control.

Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the

Philippines and the loss of Japan and might well force our western

frontier back to the coast of California, Oregon and Washington.

To understand the changes which now appear upon the Chinese

mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character and

culture over the past 50 years. China, up to 50 years ago, was

completely non-homogenous, being compartmented into groups divided

against each other. The war-making tendency was almost non-existent,

as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist

culture. At the turn of the century, under the regime of Chang Tso

Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a

nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed

under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, but has been brought to its

greatest fruition under the present regime to the point that it has

now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly

dominant, aggressive tendencies.

Through these past 50 years the Chinese people have thus become

militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now

constitute excellent soldiers, with competent staffs and commanders.

This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia, which, for its

own purposes, is allied with Soviet Russia but which in its own

concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic, with a

lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of

imperialism.

There is little of the ideological concept either one way or

another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of living is so low and

the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly dissipated by war

that the masses are desperate and eager to follow any leadership

which seems to promise the alleviation of local stringencies.

I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communists'

support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests

are, at present, parallel with those of the Soviet. But I believe

that the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea but also

in Indo-China and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the South

reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which

has animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time.

The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest

reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will,

eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have,

from the ashes left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice

dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity;

and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly

representative government committed to the advance of political

morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice.

Politically, economically, and socially Japan is now abreast of

many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal

trust. That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly beneficial

influence over the course of events in Asia is attested by the

magnificent manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent

challenge of war, unrest, and confusion surrounding them from the

outside and checked communism within their own frontiers without the

slightest slackening in their forward progress. I sent all four of

our occupation divisions to the Korean battlefront without the

slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon

Japan. The results fully justified my faith. I know of no nation more

serene, orderly, and industrious, nor in which higher hopes can be

entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the

human race.

Of our former ward, the Philippines, we can look forward in

confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected and a strong

and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war's

terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and

never fail them -- as in our hour of need, they did not fail us. A

Christian nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty bulwark of

Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high moral

leadership in Asia is unlimited.

On Formosa, the government of the Republic of China has had the

opportunity to refute by action much of the malicious gossip which so

undermined the strength of its leadership on the Chinese mainland.

The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened

administration with majority representation on the organs of

government, and politically, economically, and socially they appear

to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.

With this brief insight into the surrounding areas, I now turn to

the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the

President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea,

that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one, as we -- as I said, proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and

decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives

within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior

ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation

not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North

Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the

diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military

strategy.

Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground

forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought,

the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic

planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had

defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize the

sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that

military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary: first

the intensification of our economic blockade against China; two the

imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; three removal

of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of

Manchuria; four removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic

of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their

effective operations against the common enemy.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to

support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end

with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American

and allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles,

principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military

standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by

practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign,

including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements but was informed that reinforcements

were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the

enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize

the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not

permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds

from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of

major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military

standpoint forbade victory.

We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and in an approximate

area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply

line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only

an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon

our forces if the enemy utilized its full military potential. I have

constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a

solution.

Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said,

in effect, that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the

truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to

me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition,

as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it

useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the

second day of September, nineteen hundred and forty-five, just

following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship

Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:

Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various

methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an

international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations.

From the very start workable methods were found in so far as

individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an

instrumentality of larger international scope have never been

successful. Military alliances, balances of power, Leagues of Nations,

all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the

crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blocks out this

alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some

greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door.

The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual

recrudescence and improvement of human character that will

synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art,

literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past

2XXX years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh.

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative

than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.

War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

In war there is no substitute for victory.

There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China.

They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with

unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier

war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified

that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like

blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands

until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.

"Why," my soldiers asked of me, "surrender military advantages to

an enemy in the field?" I could not answer.

Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war

with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation

seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it

can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with

our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike

whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential

is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its

military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns

that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the

devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the

enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and

devastation.

Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole

one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of

the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description.

They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last

words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific!"

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all

tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they

are splendid in every way.

It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage

conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum

sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest

anguish and anxiety.

Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my

prayers always.

I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the

Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of

all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many

times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes

and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain

of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which

proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die; they just fade

away."

And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military

career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as

God gave him the light to see that duty.

Good Bye.